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ABSTRACT
This dialogue between Achilles and the Tortoise – in the spirit of those of Carroll and Hof-
stadter – argues against the idea, identified with the “traditional” interpretation of Aris-
totle’s “sea battle argument”, that future contingents are an exception to the Principle of 
Bivalence. It presents examples of correct everyday predictions, without which one would 
not be able to decide and to act; however, doing this is incompatible with the belief that 
the content of these predictions lacks a truth-value. The cost of using a non-classical logic 
to cope with that may be too high for Stagirite’s defenders, and they would still need to ex-
plain why our ordinary predictions seem to have a binary truth-value. In the end, the paper 
suggests that the problem of future contingents – and of free will – is not a logical problem 
at all, but rather a limit on what an agent can believe before taking a decision.
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What the Tortoise will say 
to Achilles – or “taking the 
traditional interpretation of the 
sea battle argument seriously”
Ramiro Peres1
Achilles and Tortoise are talking, while playing Battleship.
Achilles: ...then Aristotle concludes that infinity, in this case, only exists in potentia. So as I 
knew, I will overtake you. QED.
Tortoise: You are certainly confident. But notice that is a non sequitur: you have just proven 
you can reach me, but you don’t know you will reach me, necessarily. Unless you have been con-
verted by Zeno to determinism. B5?
A.: Water! Well, proving it would be logically impossible. After all, as a gaucho teacher shall 
prove in some years (Barbosa Filho, 1999, p. 15), acting is to make a proposition come true, to 
make certain what is not. Therefore, we cannot know future contingents – on which we are still 
about to act. B4?
T.: Water! Could you explain it a little better? A6.
A.: As Aristotle (1963, p. 50, De Int 9) will say in a few years, suppose we predict there will 
be no sea battle tomorrow; suppose that’s the case – it shall not happen. This implies it was true, 
yesterday, that it would not take place, and so the day before that. But if that proposition was 
always true, it means the naval battle could never occur; it is a logical necessity and, unless we 
return to our previous unpleasant discussion about modus ponens (Carroll, 1895), logic is inescap-
able. So if our forecasting was right, this battle would be impossible; if wrong, the battle would be 
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necessary. But that is absurd – it means we wouldn’t have any 
kind of free will (because everything that will occur would be 
bound to occur), and life would be meaningless: “a tale told by 
an idiot, signifying nothing”.
T.: You know, you really remind me the story of Arjuna, 
an Indian warlord who, in front of the desolating perspective 
of the war to come, considered becoming a pacifist on the eve 
of the great battle; his advisor Krishna (actually, a god’s ava-
tar) rebuked him, saying everything was already determined, 
and that, as a matter of fact, those warriors who would die 
were already dead; so the best Arjuna could do would be get-
ting into the fight to attain glory. But Arjuna still wondered: 
if it’s all previously determined, then why fight (Prasad, 1996, 
Bhagavad-Gita, III: 1-2)?
A.: That’s my point. So Aristotle’s solution (at least ac-
cording to the so-called traditional interpretation) is to aban-
don the Principle of Bivalence: although it is neither true that 
tomorrow there will be a sea battle, nor that there won’t be, 
the disjunction is true: “either there will be a battle, or there 
won’t.” This preserves our free will (Schmidt, 2009, p. 8). Af-
ter all, if the future is still underdetermined, there is no fact 
that corresponds to such sentences to make them true; how 
could we attribute a truth-value to them?
T.: I am not fully convinced that this interpretation is 
not a subtle version of the modal fallacy, as G.E.M. Anscombe 
would say (in Sorensen, 2003, p. 122-123); after all, what does 
this use of “certain”, “determined” or “necessary” add to the no-
tion of a true proposition? Furthermore, with the principle 
of bivalence, we apparently also sacrifice the idea that a dis-
junction is a truth-function of the disjoints. This can’t be done 
without a price, since it is from this truth-functional relation-
ship that we can, among other things, make certain but inac-
curate forecasts, such as “one day I will die” – equivalent to “I’ll 
die tomorrow, or the day after that, or the day after that, etc.”.
A.: You may be right. Two objections, however: as a 
criticism to the Stagirite, it would be anachronistic, since we 
are not dealing with anything like a Tarskian theory of truth 
(Barbosa Filho, 2004). If you want to do this, you should 
pick another target, such as Łukasiewicz’s (1970, p. 153-178) 
many-valued logics. Or even someone who, despite being 
chronologically posterior to us, is Prior in name – he will de-
velop a beautiful theory to deal with the truth-functionalist 
criticism (Prior, 1967).
T.: Sure, it would be fun to use non-Aristotelian logics2 
to save Aristotle. And I do love the idea of infinitely many 
truth-values, we could argue about them forever…
A.: Please, don’t. I take back what I have just said.
T.: … but I’m no expert on modal logic, more so if it de-
mands dealing with Polish notation; sometimes I need to go 
slowly even with something as simple as modus ponens, as we 
have already noted on another occasion. My point is much 
less technical than that; I’m not even sure if it’s a general argu-
ment in favor of bivalence, as we shall see – or if it applies only 
to those who reject it in order to maintain a correspondence 
theory of truth.
If you will allow me, let’s move on to a new path, so we 
may converge: you said you would reach me and commit-
ted yourself to this proposition’s truth. Now you might feel 
tempted to say you were wrong; this would be a normal error, 
as anyone can make when trying to make ordinary predic-
tions. Nevertheless, we cannot refrain from making them 
– some of them wrong, some of them right: it would be im-
possible, e.g., to plan and to rule (to take decisions on interest 
rates, agriculture, war, etc.) if we could not believe that things 
are going to be a certain way – although this belief may be 
false or inaccurate. All of our actions, in particular those re-
lating to others, aim at a future state of things that we want 
to produce. And we could not aim at anything if we could not 
think “if I do this, he will do that. So, I will do x; he will do y”. 
Otherwise, it would result in the widespread unemployment 
of strategists; “that would be complete anarchy in the conduct 
of men, with experience being plainly in contradiction. Such 
an assumption would make the existence of economy just as 
impossible as that of economic theory” (Morgenstern, 1976, 
p. 175).
So we could add: if knowledge of a proposition is incon-
sistent with acting on it (since it is the action that turns it into 
a true proposition), it is also impossible to act without believ-
ing that several future contingents are true. Call it the doxastic 
requirement: how can we abdicate from the knowledge (and 
truth) of p, and still believe in p3?
Worse, there is a range of decisions (if I can call them 
that) which sentient animals such as us do not even need to 
make consciously, because we know that a state of things will 
occur, although it is a future contingent subject to one’s de-
cision. I know, at this very moment, you will not get naked, 
2 Actually, as we will see, the following Tortoise’s argument from propositional attitudes is not very effective against anti-realist theories 
in general (for which a dissociation between belief and truth entails no problem), and against justificationist theories in particular, such 
as Dummett’s (1991) – since these theories collapse the class of what can be justifiably believed into what can be true.
3 Let’s show this is a serious requirement, using a version of “Fitch’s proof of unknowability” (in Sorensen, 2014). Let p stand for a variable 
for any proposition, and K for the “knowledge operator”. So:
1. K(p& ~Kp) (translates into “I know ‘p, but I don’t know p’”)
2. Kp & K~Kp (knowledge distributes over conjunction)
3. ~Kp (knowledge implies truth)
4. Kp & ~Kp (reductio ad absurdum).
Of course, there are infinitely many propositions for which (p& ~Kp) is true – i.e., all of the truths I ignore, such as “the number of stars 
is odd” or “the number of stars is even”. So, since (1) is a contradiction, despite the truth of (p& ~Kp), then (assuming that knowledge is 
justified true belief) the problem with this sentence is that I cannot justifiably believe it – I can’t justifiably believe in p and believe I don’t 
know p, at the same time. But this is precisely what one has to say if one wants to deny the doxastic requirement. 
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nor commit suicide, nor leave without saying goodbye. I know 
this because I know you are a rational animal, with certain 
interests and instincts; I know you have many reasons for not 
doing so, but no reason to do so (save, perhaps, to contradict 
me). I know it, even if the hypothesis has never crossed your 
mind. And I can apply the same kind of forecasting to any 
normal intelligent animal – with the possible exception of 
some existentialist philosophers.
However, if the traditional interpretation were the cor-
rect theory of future contingents, even if you did decide to 
take your clothes off, we should not believe that it would be 
true that you would do it – you could still change your mind 
until the last moment. So, even your decision could not fill this 
truth-value gap until the action took place.
A.: That is curious, as Aristotle apparently does not ig-
nore the relationship between beliefs and future states. After 
all, if every action aims at some good, at its end (Aristotle, 
2009, p. 3, EN, 1094a1), then the agent must believe that the 
good must follow from the action; i.e., beliefs and desires ne-
cessitate action (Aristotle, 2009, p. 119, EN, 1145b25-31). He 
does not seem to see any incompatibility between the theory 
of action and moral responsibility and the notion of psycho-
logical determinism related to the formation of character 
(Aristotle, 2009, p. 47, EN, 1114a16-23) rooted in our Greek 
culture – the idea that our actions are determined by who we 
are, by the way character is built. But if psychological deter-
minism is not inconsistent with the notion of moral respon-
sibility (Dworkin, 2011, p. 236-7), why should the “necessity 
of truth” (to use an expression from Barbosa Filho, 2004, p. 
234) be so? As Hardie (1968, p. 278) might ask, which of the 
two versions of Aristotle is the real one: the libertarian or the 
compatibilist – even if only a “psychological compatibilist”?
T.: Both, perhaps. Maybe he will never be fully con-
vinced of any of these theories. Alternatively, he may write 
a great dialogue on the subject – and it may be lost forever. 
Some interpreters may disagree with me, but I believe we 
will never know it; even so, I do not think there is no truth 
on this matter.
A.: We could say, however, that beliefs about future 
contingents embed probability statements; and it would 
seem reasonable to assess their truth-values as real numbers 
between [0, 1], applying the corresponding principles of the 
probability calculus (Łukasiewicz, 1970, p. 47-48). This would 
cope with your requirement that a theory of truth must be 
compatible with belief in future contingents.
T.: Indeed, it would. First, notice that it would not vindi-
cate the “traditional interpretation”, since this derives from a 
common sense view of correspondence, the thesis that future 
contingents have no truth-value – instead of lots of them, as 
you propose. As I said before, you are trying to rescue the Sta-
girite with non-Aristotelian logics.
Besides, you would still owe me an explanation of why 
I think:
(i)  my beliefs about the future are attitudes committed 
to the truth of their contents, which refer to future 
events;
(ii)  a proposition P that refers to a fact F is the same if it 
is said before (i.e., as a prediction) or after the occur-
rence of F (i.e., as a description);4
(iii)  there is a difference between saying “there will be a 
sea battle” and “it is likely there will be a sea battle” 
(which explains (i));
(iv)  this second sentence (“it is likely…”) justifies the be-
lief in the first (“there will be…”), and the truth of 
the second is usually explained by appealing to the 
truth of the first – I would even say the relation-
ship follows something function-like, perhaps in the 
manner of what Sorensen (2006, p. 607) argues: if a 
sentence p lacks a truth-value, the modest sentence 
“perhaps p” also lacks it. If, to give a crude example, 
there are nine times more possible worlds in which P 
occurs (or if the frequency of this event is nine times 
greater than its opposite), we can say that it is likely 
that P.
It would be curious to be wrong on the first point, about 
the content of my belief; moreover, I wonder what it would be 
like to believe that I am wrong in this case – not in the sense 
that the content of my first-order beliefs are false, but “wrong” 
in the sense that, in fact, I do not know what these beliefs are! 
And this happens not only in exceptional cases, such as when 
someone professes an absurd belief, but also in a routine and 
systematic way.
A.: Yet, you do believe it is logically possible to believe 
the impossible;5 it’s (apparently) logically possible that you 
are wrong, and that propositions may have a continuum of 
truth-values – that, e.g., “there will be no sea battle tomor-
row” is verified by 95% of the values of the variables (in this 
case, possible states of affairs for tomorrow). Actually, there 
are reasons to believe that our basic inferential procedures are 
Bayesian (Oaksford and Chater, 2009); and statisticians and 
risk managers do talk in this way: “there’s only a 5% chance 
that our loss will exceed our Value-at-Risk”, or “with a con-
fidence level of 95%, our result will be inside our margin for 
error of 2%”. Perhaps you should do the same.
T.: But I do not; I speak ordinary English, like everyone 
else. Besides, we could still ask these people if their forecasts 
4 Perhaps it does not entail that both statements have the same truth-value. For MacFarlane (2003), e.g., the truth-values of these de-
pend on the context of assessment – even though he thinks they are the same proposition (but with different truth-values).
5 Sorensen (2001, p. 124-125) presents a “transcendental argument” (supposedly) proving we can believe inconsistencies – but it does 
imply that we do not know these beliefs to be inconsistent. However, such “impossible” beliefs are exceptional (although inescapable: 
reason demands we have them), such as beliefs about vagueness (“there’s no last ‘noonish’ minute”). Could we say the same about 
future contingents?
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are true, if they believe them. After all, if they said “yes”, biva-
lence returns through the back door, since “it is likely there’ll 
be a battle tomorrow” is either true now, or false now – al-
though the value of “there will be a battle…” may change 
as time passes and its posterior probability is updated. If this 
is what I mean by “there will be a sea battle tomorrow”, 
then we can conclude that what I say has a well-defined 
truth-value now. 
A.: Ok, but your meta-truth-value “truth now” may 
be in a continuum, too. One could say “there’s a 99% chance 
that there’s a 95% chance that…”. Meta-analysts do this all 
the time.
T.: No problem; I’ll be satisfied with the meta-me-
ta-statement “it’s true that it’s likely that it’s likely that…”. 
If we do get to the end of this, it is the notion of contingency 
that may vanish, not truth.
A.: Wait… this is fun, but, if we proceed, we will go on 
forever – again. We have agreed to avoid that. So, let me re-
state your previous point, about usual predictions; you said 
that we know that we will not be naked, nor commit suicide…
T.: No! I said I knew you would not be naked, nor commit 
suicide. I said nothing about you knowing anything about me.
A.: I do not understand. Sure, if you think that about 
me, I can think the same about you, too. And you said “any 
normal human being”… And you would have no reason to do 
any of that, to kill yourself, or…
T.: Or getting naked? Of course. First, I am not a human 
being, nor do I consider myself normal – from my point of 
view, I am a very special reptile. And I am already naked: I 
cannot imagine what a chelonian in clothes would be like – 
something as unthinkable as a talking lion. As for suicide… 
well, a philosopher with a talent for writing will say, one day, 
that this is the real philosophical question. Moreover, leaving 
aside philosophers and terminally ill people, a person’s suicide 
is often a surprise – after all, if it were publicly planned, the 
victim’s friends would hardly have allowed it. It would also 
be a way to prove that you cannot reach me, and a dramatic 
outcome for this dialogue.
A.: But you are not really thinking about it. I know you 
will not do it; especially because it would be immoral, and you 
are a virtuous tortoise.
T.: You may be right; but if modesty is a virtue, I cannot 
say that I am virtuous either (Sorensen, 1988, p. 9). My point 
is that I could not believe it, until the moment of the decision; 
and after having made the decision, I could not avoid believ-
ing it, without reviewing the very same decision. Believing in 
“I will do x, but didn’t decide it yet” would be similar to be-
lieving in the statement “it rains, but I do not believe that it 
rains.” Let’s say I have a perspective of myself that, although 
privileged, has some “blind spots” (Sorensen, 1988). But I do 
not claim that my blind spots apply to you; you can believe 
whatever you decide to believe.
A.: This reminds me of the time we met in Paris (Hof-
stadter and Dennett, 1981, p. 430), when you made me imag-
ine what it would be like to read a book containing a complete 
description of my brain in order to predict how I would act. 
And suddenly I found myself consulting the book ad infini-
tum, since I had to check the book to update my knowledge 
about my brain-states after having checked the book.
If I have understood you correctly, your main point is not 
properly logical, but doxastic, and it is less about action theo-
ry than about decision theory. It relates not to the study of 
the truth-value of predictions, but to what we need to believe 
in order to act (our forecasts) and to what we cannot believe 
(that is, the content of the decision itself, before it occurs). The 
agent must be able to believe that others will act in a certain 
way (although it is possible that they do not act that way), but 
she cannot believe that she will act in a certain way without 
deciding so. Of course, she may feel tempted to collapse this 
blind spot into logical indeterminacy (as does McKay, 1960).
Which leads to a question: what of when another’s ac-
tion is related to my decision? I try to predict what the other 
will decide, and I will make my decision on that basis; but he 
will be doing the same. As when I was wondering where on 
the board you’d put your ships – knowing that you knew I 
was trying to guess their position… in fact, sorry, what was 
your last move?
T.: A6. That is why someone will invent game theory 
(Morgenstern and  Neumann, 1953). Usually, it does not im-
ply anything paradoxical: assuming you are rational, as am I, 
we know it would not be worth devoting my time and ener-
gy to find the set of optimal strategies for ships’ distribution, 
which is why we distribute them randomly; in fact, it is likely 
that this is the optimal distribution strategy (a mixed-strate-
gy, if you like) – as long as we avoid situations in which the 
ships get clustered. I assume you did it as well – because if I 
thought otherwise, it would be better for me to review my 
strategy. Do I know that? It depends, in part, on whether it is 
a safe or sufficient justification for my conclusion.
I think that’s the real problem behind the sea battle de-
bate: imagine that, in a possible world (let’s call it “Greece-1”), 
two generals (call them Mr. T and Mr. A) are wondering if 
they are going to engage in a fight on the next day, and both 
of them ignore that the battle will be impossible because of a 
disaster, like a tsunami; there is no ontological indeterminacy 
in this case6 (one cannot fight a battle while the earth is falling 
apart), only epistemic and doxastic indeterminacy – i.e., the 
generals don’t know there will be no battle. It suggests that 
any alleged indeterminacy, in this scenario, comes from the 
decision-makers, not from the environment.
In another possible world (“Greece-2”) accessible from 
that, but disaster-free, Mr. A thinks “No way! There will be 
no battle, I am sure, since I am defecting to Mr. T’s side”. But 
in that world, there’s no more indeterminacy, too, at least for 
6 If you think natural disasters are ontologically undetermined until they are predicted, imagine that some super scientist or prophet did 
see it coming.
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A; he cannot but believe there will be no sea battle, since he’s 
decided to avoid it (and it takes two to tango). Funny thing, 
he could neither believe in his defection, until he decided to; 
actually, he can still change his mind (which means that it is 
still possible that the battle happens), but he cannot believe he 
will do it, as long as he’s decided to defect.
However, until T is aware of this fact, he may still be-
lieve in the indeterminacy of the battle. And that is the real 
issue: both generals deemed the battle indeterminate because 
neither knew his own decision (because neither of them had 
made it yet), nor that of his opponent (because, again, none 
of them had made it yet – usually, one needs to know what 
he’s responding to in order to give the best response). Imagine 
(“Greece-3”) that both generals have common knowledge of 
their commitment to the battle, or even (“Greece-4”) to the 
peace; then there would no longer be any doubt.
A.: It is hard to imagine how, starting from common 
ignorance, this common knowledge could be achieved in a 
finite and discrete series of steps; Gen. T sends a signal 1 that 
he wants to fight, then Gen. A receives it and answers with a 
signal 2 that he wants to fight too, which is, later, received by 
T – who responds with signal 3 that he’s received 2 and is still 
going to fight, etc. This may seem implausible at first glance 
– but then it reminds me all the times I have had trouble in 
scheduling lunch with friends or setting a date; I think that is 
what they will call the “Byzantine Generals Problem” and the 
“E-mail Game” (Binmore, 2007, p. 170-171). It is worse than 
trying to race with you.
T.: Right, and despite it, we usually meet at the right time 
and place – and it is going to get easier when some technology 
offers us the possibility of sending and receiving reliable signals 
simultaneously. We could not meet if there was real doubt 
– if none of us believed the meeting was going to take place; 
we can change our minds, of course, but then we will change 
our beliefs also. And we may be mistaken; but that’s ordinary 
ignorance, and we don’t need indeterminacy to explain it.
The ontological puzzle is: how could ontological indeter-
minacy be affected by one-sided decision-making? How could 
it be affected, actually, solely by any-sided decision-making? 
The battle is still possible, but A cannot see it as indetermi-
nate; and it’s determinate for T, in Greece-2, only because of 
his ignorance.
Even if there is an explanation for such ontological 
indeterminacy, it lacks the appeal and practical relevance it 
seemed to have when we first considered the sea battle argu-
ment; now, what really should be explained is the relationship 
between an agent’s beliefs (including his beliefs about himself) 
and his own decisions.
A.: … A6, right? Water. This discussion has remind-
ed me of the son of an acquaintance: to revenge his father’s 
death, he killed his own mother because the Oracle so foretold 
(Aeschylus, 1986). I do not remember when it happened. But 
at the time of the final blow, the boy hesitates and asks an 
accomplice: “shall I kill my mother?” Then his friend reminds 
him of his obligation to Apollo and his oath.
He did not fail to believe that what the Oracle says is 
true – yet, he had doubts in the last moment. Otherwise, how 
could we call this a decision (Williams, 1993, p. 138)? This 
vindicates the main objective of Barbosa Filho (2004): the 
incompatibility between knowing and doing – at least before 
the decision is made, and as long as it is possible. E3.
T.: I can empathize with that boy. Even if I were just a 
character in a story, I could not seriously believe it possible for 
me to decide to p without believing that I will p, and (usually) 
vice versa; nor could even the author of the story make me be-
lieve it. But in this case, one could say that I would not believe 
anything; there would be no beliefs, because there would be no 
Tortoise to do the believing. However, if that were the case, 
I could not believe it either: it would be like believing in the 
sentence “I do not exist” – which is no logical absurdity, since 
its token will be true, for each and every mortal.
Alas, water!
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